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The ‘Global War on Terror,’ led by the United States, emphasizes the role of international
alliances in tackling terrorist threats. By their very nature, international counterterrorism
efforts challenge state sovereignty by requiring changes to both foreign and domestic
policies. This, in turn, creates complex sovereignty issues and raises some interesting
questions for closer examination. How has cooperation in counterterrorism altered
the perceptions and behavior of allies of the United States? Has the post-9/11 security
environment constrained the sovereignty of other nations? This paper will analyze
Canada’s cooperation with the US in order to explore these questions. The study argues
that Canada’s sovereignty has been bounded, but not determined, by US demands.
Examining the relationship between the US and Canada can help us understand both
the limitations and the continuing relevance of the traditional concepts of power,
sovereignty and interdependence in international relations.

INTRODUCTION
Given the transnational nature of
many contemporary terrorist groups, it
follows that the United States’ Global
War on Terror (GWOT) emphasizes
the role of international alliances in
tackling terrorist threats (Sageman 2004;
Asal et al. 2007; “National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism” 2006). Building
cooperative relations with other states
in counterterrorism (CT) operations
has been a challenging process. By
their very nature, international CT
operations confront state sovereignty by
requiring changes in both foreign and
domestic policies. In many cases, such
operations necessitate coordination of
overarching federal security issues with
local functions such as law enforcement
(Byman 2006b). This, in turn, creates
complex sovereignty issues, involving
a dynamic relation between domestic

and international variables (Jones
2006). Few studies have explored the
implications of this for the theory and
practice of international relations. This
paper will show how both domestic
and interstate factors came into play in
counterterrorism cooperation between
the US and Canada.
The post-9/11 environment illustrates
both US power and the limits upon it.
On the one hand, the problems the
US has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan
have exposed the boundaries of
its hegemony. On the other hand,
although perceptions of threat and
acceptable responses to them differ
widely even among the closest of allies,
we see a high degree of compliance with
US demands on counterinsurgency
and
counterterrorism
operations
(Byman 2006a). The US and many
1
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of its NATO allies have had differing,
even conflicting, positions on domestic
surveillance, interrogation and policies
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless,
US ability to harness the cooperation,
whether voluntary or through the threat
of military or economic retaliation,
of numerous countries in its so-called
war on terror illustrates the presence
of a distinct authority structure in the
international system (Donnelly 2006).
This raises some interesting issues for
closer examination. Has the post-9/11
security environment constrained the
sovereignty of other nations? How has
CT cooperation altered the perceptions
and behavior of allies of the United
States? This paper will explore Canada’s
cooperation with the US on post-9/11
security measures to understand the
extent to which Canadian sovereignty
has been limited or altered as a result.
Through a realist lens, it could be argued
that, because of the density of reciprocal
ties, US-Canada relations do not form a
typical case from which generalizations
can be made. The relations between the
two countries illuminate little about
the international system or interstate
relations in general (Keohane and Nye
2001). This paper contends that, for
precisely these reasons, the interactions
between the two neighbors deserve
closer examination. Understanding USCanada relations can help illuminate the
ramifications of dense and asymmetrical
interdependence. Some authors have
argued that the security community
2

formed by the US and Canada is
based on so many shared interests and
values that reciprocity defines their
relationship. Others are more skeptical,
arguing that the interdependence
between the two countries is so
asymmetrical that Canadian autonomy
has been severely impacted by American
dominance (Massie 2007). The findings
of this paper are that the reality lies
between these two extremes. Canadian
policy is bounded, but not determined,
by US hegemony. The asymmetrical
interdependence between the two
countries limits, but does not negate,
Canadian autonomy. Examining the
relationship between the US and
Canada, particularly in the context of
the highly-securitized environment of
the post-9/11 world, can help us probe
both the limitations and the continuing
relevance of traditional concepts of
power, sovereignty, autonomy and
interdependence.

Cooperation,
Interdependence
and Sovereignty in
International Relations
Many studies recognize the presence
of cooperative relations between states
(Axelrod 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977;
Wendt 1999; Hoffman 2006). However,
cooperation in counterterrorism (CT)
operations challenges state sovereignty
in particularly strong ways. CT
operations blur the lines between
domestic and international policy.
Highly sensitive issues, such as domestic
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surveillance, intelligence gathering and
sharing, coordination of immigration
and assimilation policies, military
cooperation and border security, are
involved.
Interdependence,
particularly
asymmetrical interdependence, can
alter the ways in which nations exercise
their sovereignty. While “sovereignty”
is a much-contested concept, a widely
cited author argues that it is has four
principal components. When a state
enjoys international legal sovereignty,
it is recognized by other states as a
legal equal. Westphalian sovereignty
establishes
a
state’s
territorial
boundaries and asserts that the state has
sole control over legitimate behavior
within this territory. Interdependent
sovereignty means that the state has the
ability to control movements across its
borders. Finally, domestic sovereignty
or autonomy asserts that the state and
its rulers have the capacity to make
policy and control developments within
their jurisdictional territory (Krasner
1999). Complete sovereignty implies
that the state is free from any form of
external control and can autonomously
make policy free from the interference
of other governments. In short,
sovereignty refers to the idea that states
are autonomous and independent from
each other. While some might view
that sovereignty implies a grant of
unconstrained will and power to the
state, sovereignty has, in fact, always
been limited by international norms,

laws and the actions of other states. The
degree to which a state’s sovereignty is
constrained is relative to its military,
economic and ideational power. For
example, the US has, for much of its
existence, enjoyed a considerable degree
of autonomy and control; however,
less powerful states have not (Krasner
2001c, 2001b).
Globalization
and
growing
interdependence have altered the
degree to which states are, in fact,
autonomous. While smaller states are
most often constrained in their exercise
of sovereignty, even larger countries
such as the US may find their autonomy
limited by external forces, such as
trade agreements or the demands of
other governments. A state can limit
another’s ability to formulate policy
and control its borders in a variety of
different ways. The more complex and
dense the ties between two countries,
the more influence they may have
on each other. If one state has greater
military or economic power, it can
exercise a greater degree of influence
over weaker countries. On the other
hand, the concept of ‘defense against
help’ illustrates how less powerful states,
such as Canada, use a mix of unilateral
and cooperative defense measurements
to protect themselves while also
working with the dominant state,
such as the US (Barry and Brat 2008).1
As will be demonstrated in this paper,
interdependence, and asymmetrical
interdependence in particular, can

Barry and Brat (2008)
provide a valuable, historical perspective of how
Canada has worked with
the US but has also taken
unilateral steps to protect
its own interests. This
article extends the discussion of small state-large
state security relations by
discussing the concept of
bounded sovereignty and
providing a closer examination of the developments
since 2001.
1
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exercise an important constraining
influence on sovereignty. While this is
the case in many areas of cooperation,
such as climate governance and trade,
balancing security, interdependence and
sovereignty is particularly challenging.
This is because security-related issues,
such as countering terrorism and
enhancing border security, are seen
as particularly germane to a nation’s
immediate interests.

Cooperation between
the US and Canada in
Counterterrorism
The relationship between the US and
Canada involves a very high degree
of trust. Canada has been a steadfast
political, military and economic ally
of the US for several decades. The
two countries have a relationship
of close, albeit highly asymmetric,
interdependence. Canada’s economic
well-being is dependent on its trade with
the US, while the reverse does not hold
to the same degree. Almost $1.2 billion
in trade crosses the US-Canada border
every day. While about 25 percent of
US trade goes to Canada, 87 percent of
Canada’s trade is US-bound. 40 percent
of Canada’s GDP is tied to exports to the
US, while only 2.5 percent of US GDP is
tied to exports to Canada. At the same
time, while the US economy is more
diversified, Canada remains a crucial
partner for American business (Byman
2006b). Canada is the leading energy
supplier to the US, making it a very
valuable ally. In sum, the two countries
4

are highly interdependent; however,
the power differential between them
illustrates a classic case of asymmetric
interdependence, with Canada as the
junior partner.
The US and Canada are closely
tied
through
collective
security
arrangements. Conflicts between the
two countries are, and are expected to
be, resolved peacefully. War is not even
considered a remote possibility (Adler
and Barnett 1998; Donnelly 2006;
Jackson 2007). One example of the trustbased relationship between the two
countries is the shared border which,
historically, has had few compliance or
monitoring mechanisms in place. This
is not to say that border relations have
been completely devoid of conflict;
however, in large part, they have been
harmonious and cooperative.
The events of 9/11 altered this
dynamic. In the immediate aftermath
of the attack, the border was virtually
sealed,
adversely
affecting
the
substantial volume of trade between
the two countries. Subsequently, several
prominent
American
lawmakers,
including Senator Hillary Clinton,
alleged that some of the 9/11 hijackers
entered the US across the Canadian
border. While the allegation proved to
be untrue, overall concerns about the
‘porous border’ remained. The Report
of the 9/11 Commission highlighted
concerns
about
border
security.
It pointed out that the American
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government had failed to consider
the potentially dangerous impact of
Canada’s immigration and refugee
policies. It also noted existent terrorist
group activity in Canada. Other
prominent studies have discussed the
activities of the Sri Lankan group, the
Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE),
and the Canada-based Sikh militants
who masterminded the bombing of an
Air India flight in 1985 (Rae 2005; Lake
2007; Becker 2006). The 9/11 report
faulted the American government for
not having added resources on the
border even after a potential terrorist
had entered the US through Canada
in 1999.2 It called for the tightening
of border controls through measures
such as the introduction of biometric
passports and visas. The proposal on
biometrics was subsequently passed
into law through the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002 (“The 9/11 Commission Report”
2004; Rudolph 2006).3
In June 2006, Canadian authorities
arrested a group of suspected terrorists
in Toronto, who were accused of
planning attacks within Canada.
This exacerbated US (and Canadian)
anxiety. Some Congresspersons were
critical of the allegedly lax attitude of
the Canadian Prime Minister towards
the possibility of Islamist terrorists
being present in his country (“The
Need to Implement WHTI to Protect US
Homeland Security” 2006). Although
the initial fear of the unprotected border

has decreased, and hard evidence
about alleged terrorists “infiltrating”
the US through Canada is noticeably
absent, the American government has
continued to implement a number
of measures that restrict free passage
across the US-Canada border.

A Security
Predicament Between
Friends
For most of the period since the
American Civil War, the open border
between the two countries has not
only facilitated trade and relatively
open movement of people, but also
symbolized a strong, trust-based
relationship. The apprehension of
Ahmed Ressam in December 1999
raised some, albeit limited, concerns
about the shared border. Ressam, an
Algerian national who had been living
in Canada for five years, was arrested
after attempting to enter Washington
State on a ferry from Victoria, BC,
with a trunk full of explosive material.
This incident prompted the first set of
concerns within the US Congress about
the Canadian border (Andreas 2005);
however, it did not have a lasting
impact on border security policies.
9/11 securitized the relationship
between
the
neighbors
to
an
unprecedented degree. Although no
one from or in Canada played any
role in the attacks, the border created
a deep sense of derived or perceptual
insecurity for the US. The situation

This was a reference
to Ahmed Ressam, the
so-called “millennium
bomber,” who was apprehended while attempting
to enter the US through
Washington state in December 2009.
2

The full Report of the
9/11 Commission can be
found at
http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
3
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can be seen as analogous to a security
dilemma. A security dilemma occurs
because attempts made by one state to
increase its own security may decrease
the perceived security of another state.
Given the anarchic structure of the
international system, constant mistrust
and uncertainty about the motivations
of others perpetuates insecurity among
states (Jervis 1978).

Note that the 9/11
attackers had no links
whatsoever to Canada.
4

6

The concept of the security dilemma is
usually employed to explain adversarial
relations between states such as India
and Pakistan, or the US and USSR. Yet, it
can also explain why, after 9/11, the US
viewed Canada, one of its most reliable
allies, with such intense suspicion.
While this is a departure from the
traditional application of the concept,
it helps us understand the perceptual
mistrust that entered the relationship
in response to exogenous events.4 This
development is particularly noteworthy
because of the close cooperation
between the two countries across
a number of issues. At issue were
Canada’s domestic policies, namely
what the US believed to be Canada’s
excessively liberal immigration laws.
In the heightened crisis environment,
Americans perceived these policies as
threatening to their security interests.
They feared that the open border
between the two countries would be
exploited by potential terrorists seeking
to enter the US through Canada. In other
words, although the Canadian state
continued to be seen as a trustworthy

ally, its internal policies became a
cause of US insecurity. This insecurity
was predicated on the American
perception that Canada was unwilling
and unable to control its borders and
limit the activities of potential terrorists
operating within Canadian territory.
The security predicament discussed
here is certainly distinct from the
traditional notion of a dilemma,
in that the latter refers to a spiral
of aggressive actions as a result of
perceived threats. In this case, we
did not see a breakdown in relations
or cooperation, nor an escalation in
aggressive posturing. What did occur
was a negative US reaction to Canadian
domestic politics and border policing.
Canadian policies on immigration and
border controls were seen to threaten
US interests. Like traditional security
dilemmas, however, this one was based
on perception, rather than an objective
understanding of Canadian policies or
their possible impact. Nonstate actors,
rather than the Canadian state itself,
are seen as the threat. Such an approach
marks an interesting shift away from a
militarized perception of security and
borders (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006;
Andreas 2003), revealing the complex
intersection between domestic and
foreign policy.
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Cooperation after
9/11: Canadian
Deference to US
Hegemony
When states are uncertain about
the motivations of other states,
they demand signals of reassurance
(Kydd 2001). After 9/11, the US faced
uncertainty about the implications of
Canada’s domestic policies. Canada
is widely seen by the international
community as having one of the
world’s most generous immigration
and asylum-granting policies. Any
person who arrives in Canada can apply
for refugee status and move around
the country freely while awaiting a
determination. Those who are denied
refugee protection are not aggressively
pursued for deportation. From the
perspective of American lawmakers,
such policies could allow potential
security threats to go unnoticed (Smick
2006). The US solution to this was fairly
simple: Canada should reassure the US
by modifying its domestic laws in line
with American interests or face a more
restrictive border (de Nevers 2007). In
effect, this meant that the US sought
to limit Canadian autonomy in the
formulation of domestic policy and the
regulation of its border.
In response, the Canadian government
took a series of steps to mitigate US
concerns and assure the Americans
that bilateral cooperation would not
endanger national security. Because
the US was not directly threatened

by
Canadian
actions,
Canada’s
reassurances contained no promises of
self-restraint. Rather, Canada promised
that it would cooperate on border
security and restrain those citizens,
residents or visitors who might aim
to harm the US. Such reassurances, by
their very nature, require changes in
domestic policy and therefore constrain
the exercise of national sovereignty.
Although Canadian officials often
seek to give the impression to their
public that they are resisting pressure
from Washington and making decisions
independent of US concerns, it is clear
that several changes have been made
to avoid punitive action by the US
(Andreas, 2003).5 Steps taken to address
US concerns included the Canada-US
Smart Border Declaration and Action
Plan and Free and Secure Trade (FAST),
which facilitates the cross-border flow of
regular commercial traffic (Wasem et al.
2006). The declaration does not include
any enforcement mechanisms. No
sanctions or other punishments were
stipulated in the accord; nonetheless,
compliance with its provisions has been
high. This is a significant display of the
shared norms, as well as continuing
trust-based
interactions
that
are
common between the two countries.
Domestic policies in Canada were also
modified to a significant degree. For
example, in December 2001, Canada
passed the Anti-Terror Act. Among
other measures, this Act provides for a

The extent to which
public comments about
‘autonomy’ have been
made has differed between
the Liberal government of
former Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien and the current
Conservative government
led by Stephen Harper.
5
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For example, the US lists
the Shining Path of Peru
as a FTO while Canada
does not. Identification of
Islamist terrorist groups,
particularly in the Middle
East, is virtually identical.
6

http://geo.international.
gc.ca/can-am/washington/
defence/cirpaposition-en.
asp.
7

http://www.canadianally.
com/ca/pdf/natsecurnat_e.
pdf.
8

See http://geo.international.gc.ca/can-am/
washington/defence/
misperceptions-en.asp for
more information.
9

8

list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
very similar to that identified by the
US Department of State.6 In June 2002,
Canada introduced an Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) which
provided for the expedited removal
of persons who pose security threats,
additional screening for asylum seekers
and new penalties on those providing
false evidence to enter or remain in
Canada (Harvey 2005). In 2003, Canada
created Public Safety Canada, which was
its corollary to the US Department of
Homeland security, giving a centralized
umbrella to departments and agencies
responsible for national security. These
steps were supposedly taken to protect
national security; but, notwithstanding
a few exceptions, there is little evidence
that Canada’s physical security was
under direct and immediate threat. A
more likely explanation is that the US’s
security predicament was threatening
Canada’s economic interests (Lennox
2007).
As mentioned earlier, insecurity is an
inherently perceptual phenomenon.
As a result, Canada launched a spirited
public relations campaign to dispel the
damaging perception that its domestic
policies and the open border were
damaging American security interests.
A prominent section of the website of
the Canadian Embassy in Washington,
D.C., is devoted to assuaging US anxiety,
reiterating that Canadian immigration
laws are designed to screen out those
who are a threat to national security.7

“CanadaAlly,” another governmentsponsored
website,
emphasizes
Canada’s steadfast support of the US.
Reassuring American audiences that
enhancing border security is a priority
for Canada, it promises to streamline
and tighten immigration policies and
screen for potential entrants into the
country.8 Interestingly, the website also
vigorously objects to the argument
that similar methods of security and
screening be applied to the northern
and southern borders of the US.9
This highlights Canada’s interest in
maintaining a “special relationship”
with its neighbor, based on a mutuality
of interests and identities. Because
immigration policies are considered
a sovereign issue, it is an unusual step
in international relations for a country
to assuage the security concerns of its
neighbor by changing its policies.

Constrained
Sovereignty or
Calculated SelfInterest?
Does this mean that Canadian
sovereignty is subordinate to US
demands? In fact, a closer examination
shows us that Canada’s actions and
policies are not entirely a function of
US hegemonic control. Historically,
Canada has been able to obtain
valuable concessions from the US that
have resulted in economic benefits for
Canada. In a study of interstate disputes
between 1950 and 1969, Keohane and
Nye (2001) find that, in at least half of
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the cases, the outcomes were closer to
the interests of Canada than the US.
This was achieved partly through skillful
bargaining, which can compensate
for an unfavorable asymmetry in
power structure. In addition, Canada
is an important enough trade partner,
both in volume of American exports
and US reliance on Canada’s energy
imports, that the US cannot assert an
entirely unilateral approach towards its
northern neighbor.
Changes to Canada’s immigration
and refugee policies have been under
active consideration by the Canadian
government since at least 1997.
Elements of the Anti-Terrorist Act of
December 2001 and the Public Safety
Act 2001 were first considered in
1998. Since 1984, Canada has been
deeply concerned about the activities
of terrorist groups within its territory
(Massie 2007). 9/11 provided an
opportunity to institutionalize some
long-considered policy modifications.
In sum, although deference to US
demands was a major trigger for the
changes to domestic policy, it was
by no means the only motivating
factor. Nonetheless, Canada’s efforts to
publicize new policies to a US audience
illustrate the fact that reassuring
Americans is considered pivotal to
Canadian interests.
Reciprocal, rather than unilateral,
trust-based interactions have long
been the defining feature in bilateral

relations. Information sharing, within
the bounds of national sovereignty, has
underlined several cases of successful
law enforcement both before and
after 9/11. Joint investigation and
real-time information sharing have
led to successful operations against
illegal immigration in both countries.
Another area in which formal and
informal contacts between officials
have been useful to the interest of both
countries is in the effort to combat drug
trafficking.10 Shared surveillance and
tracking techniques have been used
extensively in anti-narcotics operation
throughout both countries. Attempts
have been made to synchronize and
harmonize drug importation policies
and
criminal
justice,
reflecting
a
reciprocity-based
approach
to
cooperation (Andreas and Nadelmann
2006). Canadian authorities are often
interested in having cross-border drugrelated offences tried in the US because
of more stringent incarceration laws. In
addition, entities such as the Integrated
Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and
the Integrated Border Intelligence Team
show examples of policy coordination
based on reciprocity rather than
hegemonic domination.11

Resistance to US
Hegemony: Iraq and
the Arar Case
Even in matters of security, while
adopting
a
generally
deferential
policy towards its neighbor, Canada
has resisted US hegemony in a few

Interview with Canadian and American
officials, 2007

10

Interview with Canadian and American officials,
2007

11
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Personal interview with
Canadian officials, 2007.

12

See for example, Garcia,
Michael John. 2007. “Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture.”
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/RL32890.pdf (June
5, 2008).

13
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areas. Canada’s refusal to support the
war in Iraq was an unusual, thought
not unprecedented, case in which
Canada turned down its closest allies,
the UK and the US. Canadian public
opinion ran strongly against the war, in
particular because it was not supported
by the United Nations (Vucetic 2006).
While Canada is constrained in bilateral
security relations, it has more flexibility
in
responding
to
international
situations. Multilateral institutions such
as the United Nations are a mechanism
for it to try to constrain the behavior
of large powers (Barry and Brat 2008).
The case of Maher Arar highlighted the
conflicts that can arise when interstate
cooperation interferes with domestic
interests. As a result of the controversy,
Canadian guidelines on informationsharing for Canadian officials have
changed. For example, cases involving
national security concerns must now
be routed through Ottawa rather
than being handled at the local or
provincial level.12 Such centralization
is an unusual development in the
trust-based relations between the
two countries. Such constraints may
also adversely impact the US-driven
interest in speedy and agile information
sharing in counterterrorism operations.
Interestingly, the extent to which
rendition and other counterterrorism
practices have been questioned by
the American public and Congress
highlights a significant amount of doubt
within the US about the acceptability,
validity and desirability of such actions.

This illustrates a common normative
perspective between the two countries.13

Asymmetrical
Interdependence and
Bounded Sovereignty
The US and Canada can be categorized
as unprovokable allies, who enjoy
cooperation predicated on trust. Such
allies have a high density of ties and
require few compliance mechanisms. At
the same time, trust and suspicion are
not dichotomous variables; rather, they
co-exist on a continuum. Levels of trust
may change with reference to specific
issues among allies, as they have with
regard to Canada and border security.
9/11 did not alter the fundamental
nature and structure of US-Canadian
relations, which is marked both by a
history of reciprocal relations and clear
American dominance. Nonetheless, the
level of trust between the two countries
did erode to some extent. This was
particularly the case from the point of
view of the US government. Prior to
2001, the open border between the two
countries symbolized a relationship of
mutual trust, requiring little enforcement
and relying on localized interactions.
After 9/11, many Americans viewed
the border as something that could
be exploited by potential terrorists.
This led the US government to pursue
an unprecedented level of border
security and to demand changes to
Canadian domestic policies. Dense
ties continued, but the relationship
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was marked by increasing American
assertion. Concerned about national
economic interests, the Canadian
government acceded to many American
requests. This shows that, given a
relationship marked by asymmetrical
interdependence,
Canadian
policy
autonomy was constrained by US
demands.
At the same time, American CT
operations affected Canada’s trust in
the US, particularly after Mr. Arar’s
rendition. This case directly led
Canada to solidify its own monitoring
mechanisms, designed to centralize,
supervise and limit informationsharing between the two countries.
While Canada has complied with many
US demands, it still exercises strong
national sovereignty, as demonstrated
by its refusal to participate in the Iraq

war and its responses to Mr. Arar’s
rendition (Hillmer 2003; Cooper 2005;
Sands 2006).
Figure 1 illustrates some of the
changes in relations between the two
countries since 2001. Prior to the 9/11
attacks, close ties and high trust levels
underlined
US-Canada
exchanges.
After 9/11, a security predicament
arose among American audiences as
a result of heightened anxiety about
Canadian policies towards immigrants.
In response, Canada offered several acts
of reassurance which constrained its
sovereignty but protected its economic
interests. Close, reciprocal ties have
continued, but within an altered
dynamic.
The relationship between the US and
Canada illustrates the contradictory

Figure 1: Impact of 9/11 on Bilateral Relations

Pre-9/11

9/11

Post-9/11

USA

USA
Security
predicament

Increasing anxiety
Unilateral demands

Dense ties
High trust levels
Asymmetric interdependence

CANADA

CANADA
Acts of reassurance
Bounded sovereignty
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pulls of sovereignty and asymmetrical
interdependence. The US extends
its hegemony over both interstate
interactions and Canadian domestic
policy. Canada, while relinquishing
significant amounts of its sovereignty,
gains from the benefits of the political
and economic order provided by the
dominant state. The legitimacy of the
hierarchical relationship rests on the
ability of the US to provide a stable
economic and political order which
helps maintain Canada’s prosperity and
security (Lake 2007).

More nuanced conceptions of sovereignty also
exist, such as discussions
about ‘peoples’ sovereignty’
or the right of citizens to
be protected from human
rights abuses committed by
their government.
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This does not, however, mean that
Canada’s sovereignty is lost; rather, it is
bounded by the US-led hierarchy. If we
view sovereignty as territorial integrity
and political independence (Sinclair
and Byers 2007), we can conclude that
Canada does enjoy both.14 However;
its political independence is bounded
by its interdependent relation with
the US. For Canada, both its military
and economic security are closely,
even inextricably, linked to the US.
From this perspective, deference to the
demands of the US is not so much an
outcome of limited sovereignty, as it is
a conscious choice. The choice is based
both on rational self-interest (protect
Canada’s trade and military alliance
with the US) as well as ideational factors
(shared norms under the collective
security arrangement with the US).
Interests and identities are not static
concepts; rather actors acquire them
by participating in collective actions

and meanings (Wendt, 1999). Canada
has relinquished some of its autonomy
to its collective arrangements with
the US, but it has done so in order to
protect its own interests. A parallel can
be found in the European Union, where
members make voluntary arrangements
which restrict policy autonomy but
optimize outcomes in other issue areas,
such as trade or collective security
(Krasner 2001a). Such a development
highlights a fascinating phenomenon;
that of states choosing to constrain
their autonomy in highly sensitive
issues (such as immigration) in order
to strengthen bilateral (or multilateral)
interdependence.
Despite its hierarchical nature, the
relationship between the two countries
is one of interdependence. It is not
entirely defined by American demands
and Canadian compliance. The large
shared border between the two countries
makes Canada perennially significant
for American security, both from an
economic and a military point of view.
A cooperative, rather than recalcitrant,
Canada is certainly more beneficial for
the US. The controversy surrounding
the Arar case shows the pitfalls of
excessive unilateral action. In addition,
Canada’s considerable economic clout
and its international ‘peacekeeper’
image can make it a valuable partner
in influencing state sponsors of
terrorism (Byman 2006b; Ignatieff
2003). An understanding of the layers
of complexity in relations of bilateral
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and
multilateral
interdependence
constitutes a valuable contribution to
the study and practice of international
relations.
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